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(Bonneville County District Court Case
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ARGUMENT
ISSUE #1: A. Roberts' Disclosures Were Untimely and Insufficient
Hansen argued that Roberts' expert disclosures were untimely and insufficient. In
response, Roberts did not dispute that Roberts' rule 26(b)(4) disclosures were not made
until after the close of discovery and only weeks before trial. Further, Roberts did not
dispute that he failed to disclose the identity of one expert, John Droge, until just two
weeks before trial and two and a-half months after expert disclosures were due pursuant
to the trial court's scheduling order.
Roberts argues that this Court should find the disclosures timely because Roberts
was still conducting discovery after the expert disclosure deadlines and after the close of
discovery. However, Roberts' timing issues are due solely to the late start he made to
begin discovery in earnest. Roberts failed to explain to this Court that he did not file a
notice to depose Hansen until August 18, 2010, nine days after the discovery cutoff
deadline. See R. Vol. I, p. 86.
Roberts admitted that Hansen responded to written discovery on March 11, 2010,
but provides no explanation as to why he waited over five months and until after the
discovery cutoff to conduct depositions and follow up on discovery responses he felt
were insufficient. Roberts disingenuously states that his decision to wait five months,
and until after the discovery cutoff, to start discovery in earnest was Hansen's fault. The
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fault for the delay rests squarely on Roberts' shoulders for failing to conduct discovery
before the discovery cutoff deadline and before his expert disclosure deadline.
Roberts also incorrectly suggested that he could unilaterally "reserve the right" to
file late expert disclosures because his experts were rebuttal experts. Roberts' position is
incorrect because his experts were not rebuttal experts and he has no right to unilaterally
change the court's scheduling order. Roberts filed a counterclaim seeking damages to his
vehicle and, in addition, raised affirmative defenses of comparative fault and pre-existing
injuries. Roberts had the burden of proving that Hansen was legally liable to Roberts to
recover the damages he sought as well as to prove his affirmative defenses. Accordingly,
the expert witnesses he called were not rebuttal witnesses but witnesses who testified in
Roberts' case in chief to prove his counterclaim and affirmative defenses. See Aguilar v.
Coonrod, 262 P.2d 671, 677 (Idaho 2011) (affirming trial court decision to exclude

untimely disclosed expert who intended to testifY to prove an affirmative defense).
Roberts' response also completely failed to address the standard of review - an
abuse of discretion - and show how the trial court's decision was not an abuse of
discretion. When determining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court
considers three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently
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with applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its decision through an
exercise of reason. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006).
When the issue of timeliness of expert disclosures was addressed by the court
below, Roberts' counsel made the conclusory statement that, "I believe they were
disclosed timely." Tr. Vol. I., p. 333, L. 12 The trial court then made the conclusory
ruling: "All right. They will be allowed to testifY."
The trial court clearly did not meet any of the three required prongs to show that it
did not abuse its discretion by allowing expert testimony from witnesses whose
disclosures were not timely.

Accordingly, judgment should be vacated and the case

remanded for a new trial

B. Kimbrough Invaded the Province of the Jury

Hansen argued that the trial court erred in allowing Kimbrough to testifY about
whether Hansen was negligent because it is inappropriate to allow an expert to provide
testimony on subjects that are not beyond the common sense of the average juror. In
response, Roberts argues that Hansen failed to object during the trial testimony so he
waived the right to challenge the admissibility of the evidence on appeal.
Hansen did object during Kimbrough's trial testimony, just as it began, and sought
and received a continuing objection that his testimony invaded the province of the jury:
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Q By Ms. Brizee: Dr. Kimbrough, what did you do in this case?
A Tried to reconstruct the accident. So, for example,
Mr. Gordon: Objection, Your Honor. Can I make an objection to all his
testimony as to invading the province of the jury?
THE COURT: You have a continuing objection.
See Tr. Vol. I., p. 353 L. 19 through 354 L. 1.

Roberts notes that Kimbrough's opinion testimony was that the crash took place
because of a "careless right-hand turn by the plaintiff' and that Kimbrough's opinion was
based on Kimbrough's opinion of what Roberts was thinking at the time he passed
Hansen on the right.

See Br. 12 and 13.

Such opinion testimony, as discussed in

Hansen's initial brief, is inadmissible.
The trial court erred by allowing Kimbrough to testifY as to who, in his opinion,
was at fault for causing the crash because such testimony invades the province of the jury
and is not helpful.

C. The Issue Regarding Droge's Testimony is Moot
Hansen argued that the trial court erred in allowing Droge testifY because Roberts
failed to provide adequate foundation that Droge's testimony was scientifically reliable.
In response, Roberts argues that Droge's testimony is moot since the jury found Hansen
negligent and Droge's testimony only went to causation of injuries.
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Hansen agrees with Roberts that Droge's testimony only addressed causation of
InJunes.

That said, it is, at the very least, interesting to learn about the unreliable

methodology used to support Droge's testimony and the body of case law that supports
exclusion of such testimony. Given the unscientific methodology employed by Droge, it
is now apparent why Roberts did not disclose the basis and methodology used to support
Droge's opinion that a violent crash that caused significant damage to the vehicles
involved would translate to extremely minimal forces to the passengers.

Obviously,

providing the methodology, basis, and facts supporting Droge's opinions, as required by
rule 26(b)(4), would bring transparency and light to the unscientific opinions and would
allow counsel to effectively cross examine Droge. The information that Hansen elicited
from Droge during cross examination - which was not provided in the rule 26(b)(4)
disclosures - highlights the problems caused by Roberts' untimely and incomplete
disc I osures.
ISSUE #2:

The trial court erred in ruling that Hansen waived the

objections he made during Roberts' video deposition.
Hansen argued that the trial court erred when it ruled that Hansen waived the
objections he made during Roberts' video deposition by not addressing those objections
during a hearing that was scheduled to review jury instructions. In response, Roberts
concedes that a hearing was not set for the sole purpose of addressing the parties'
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objections and that at no time did the trial court invite Hansen or order Hansen to raise
his objections to the deposition during the hearing set to review jury instructions. Thus,
the trial court was clearly wrong when it concluded that Hansen waived the right to raise
his objections at trial.
Hansen had the right under rule 32(b) to raise his objections at trial. See Idaho
R. Civ. P. 32(b) (noting that "objection may be made at the trial ... to receiving in
evidence any deposition ... for any reason which would require the exclusion of the
evidence if the witness were then present and testifYing."). Roberts argues that the rule
does not apply to video depositions because video depositions need to be edited prior to
trial. Roberts provides absolutely no legal authority whatsoever to support his argument
and the rules of civil procedure clearly contradict Roberts' position.
If Roberts wanted to edit the video prior to trial then he should have asked the
trial court to rule on all of the objections raised during the depositions. Roberts cannot
blame Hansen for waiting to trial to raise his objections when the rule clearly allows him
to do so.
Roberts then argues that the hearsay documents of Roberts' vehicle damage was
admissible; that Roberts' out of court statements were not hearsay; and that he did not
violate the court's prior ruling by testifYing that he did not receive a citation.
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Roberts argues that the documents he submitted regarding the repair estimates
for his vehicle are admissible because Hansen testified as to the amount of his vehicle
damage and because Roberts made a statement about what he remembered he was told by
the mechanic as to how much his repairs would cost. Roberts did not object to Hansen
stating the amount of his vehicle repairs but if he did, the trial court, if acting properly,
would have sustained the objection.

See Philips v. Erhart, 254 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2011)

(holding that objections to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal and that
hearsay evidence admitted without objection is as strong as any other legally competent
evidence).

Further, Roberts' statement about what the mechanic told him about the

amount of repair charges is still hearsay because it is based on the out-of-court statement
made by the mechanic.
Roberts argues that his own statements that were made out-of-court and offered
during his examination by his own counsel are not hearsay. The rule is clear that a
statement is not hearsay only if it was (1) offered against a party and (2) is that party's
own statement.

See Idaho R. Evid. 80 l( d)(2). Roberts' statements were not offered

against Roberts, but for him, so the statements are hearsay. See State v. Gerrardo, 147
Idaho 22 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (holding that trial court misunderstood the hearsay
definition when it allowed a statement by Gonzales, a party to the case, to be used against
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Gerardo, who was also a party to the case, because the statement, to not be considered
hearsay, could only be offered against the party making the statement).
Finally, Roberts argues that his statement that he did not receive a citation was
not objectionable even though the trial court had ordered the parties not to present
testimony about citations. Roberts' argument that the court order concerning the citation
was extremely narrow and that Hansen should have expanded the motion in limine to
include testimony about whether Roberts received a citation is disingenuous because
Roberts specifically asked the trial court for guidance on the scope of its ruling and
indicated that she would like to ask Roberts whether he received a citation along with the
police officer and Kimbrough.
Roberts' Counsel: "With Matt Roberts, my plan was to ask him: Did you
receive a citation as a result of this accident? And he'll say, no, because he
didn't. Mr. Hansen got the citation. Can I ask him that question? It's notthat's not dealing with Mr. Hansen, whether or not he received or didn't
receive a citation, but it's kind of linked, so I thought I better bring it up
with the Court while we're talking about this."
See Tr. Vol. L, p. 47 L. 24 through 49 L. 5.

The trial court ruled: "I'm going to grant the motion to the extent that it deals with
testimony and/or admission of the citation." See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 51 L. 18. The trial court
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then went on to clarifY that his ruling extended to all witnesses mentioning the citation
but that he would allow the police officer and accident reconstructionist to testifY about
factual circumstances: "I would bar any comment concerning the citation itself by either
the officer or the reconstruction expert." See Tr. Vol. I., p. 53 L. 8.
Thus, Roberts' suggestion that the trial court's ruling was only narrowly limited
to testimony of Hansen is wrong and Roberts sought and obtained clarification from the
trial court as to the scope of the ruling and the trial court clearly extended the prohibition
of testimony regarding the citation to all witnesses.
Roberts's argument that Hansen's objection was not proper fails because Hansen
was prohibited from objecting to the testimony at trial. Rule 32(b) allows Hansen to
object to deposition testimony at trial but Hansen was precluded from doing so under the
trial court's erroneous ruling. Thus, Roberts' arguments that Hansen had to object based
on the violation of the court's order is wrong since Hansen was precluded from objecting
in the first instance.
Finally, Roberts' arguments that the error was harmless is wrong because no
evidence whatsoever was presented to support Roberts' damages so the outcome of the
case would certainly have been different if Roberts was precluded from introducing
hearsay statements to prove his damages. Further, the allocation of fault would probably
be significantly different if Roberts was prohibited from making self-serving hearsay
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statements and ifhe was prohibited from violating the court's order prohibiting testimony
regarding citations.

As noted in Hansen's initial brief, the jury was considering

allocating fault 5l/49 but asked if it could award Roberts 90 percent of his damages.
When the court said, "no," the jury then found Hansen 90 percent at fault so it could give
Roberts, who it knew just underwent a liver transplant, money to repair his car. Since the
case involves a claim and a counterclaim, any difference in the allocation of fault will
make a difference in the amount Hansen has to pay to Roberts or may result in an award
to Hansen if he is given a fair trial.
ISSUE #3: Limitations on Voir Dire

Hansen argued that the trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Hansen from
inquiring whether a prospective juror or one of his family members were or had ever
been employed by an insurance carrier. In response, Roberts argued that Hansen did not
raise the issue of whether he could inquire about potential juror's past employment with
an insurance company until the day of trial and that by waiting until the day of trial,
Hansen did not preserve the issue for appeal. However, the only case law cited in support
of Roberts' argument state that an issue must be raised at trial to preserved on appeal and
Hansen clearly sought permission to inquire about a potential juror's past employment
before jury selection commenced so the issue was preserved.
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A blanket rule prohibiting the mention of insurance at all prevents a plaintiff from
discovering whether potential jurors is biased due to juror or the juror's family's
employment with insurance companies.

Issue #4: Roberts is not entitled to attorney fees.
Roberts seeks fees, arguing that Hansen's appeal was frivolous. The request for
fees is unsupported by any discussion as to what arguments it believes are frivolous. An
unsupported and conclusory statement is not sufficient to provide this Court or Hansen
with proper notice of the basis or reasoning supporting such a request and should be
denied. See Idaho R. App. P. 35(5).

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Hansen requests that this Court vacate the judgment in
favor of Roberts and remand to the trial court for a new trial.
DATED this 6th day of April, 2012.

Brent Gordon
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on this 6th day of April, 2012, I faxed and caused two (2) true
and correct copies of the foregoing instrument to be delivered to the following via U.S.
Mail, postage prepaid:
Jennifer K. Brizee
POWERS TOLMAN, PLLC
P.O. Box 1276
Twin Falls, ID 83303-1276
Fax: (208) 733-5444

Brent Gordon

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

12

